VOL. VI, NO. 6

DAMS THREATEN WEST COAST
FISHERIES INDUSTRY

DR. P.R. NEEDHAM
Director of Fisheries, Oregon State Game Commission

     Some of the plans of the dam builders, if completed, will completely ruin for all time some of the richest fishery resources of this nation. The principal streams concerned are the Sacramento in California, the Rogue in Oregon, and the Columbia with its principal tributaries in Washington, Oregon and Idaho. The construction of Bonneville and Grand Coulee dams on the Columbia River and Darn on the upper Sacramento River in California began a new era of potential ruin from the standpoint of fisheries.

     We in fisheries frequently hear the engineers complain that biologists cannot agree among themselves on the best ways and means of protecting anadromous fish runs blocked by dams. They say that we “hem” and we “haw” and can never agree. There is good reason for this. Until Grand Coulee Dam was built on the upper Columbia, fishery biologists had never been called upon to answer problems of the magnitude of those presented by Coulee. At Coulee a major backbone stream was completely blocked, and there was no previous experience upon which to formulate a plan. After the steam shovels had started work, somebody remembered that there were steelhead and chinook and sockeye salmon that would be blocked, and something ought to be done to save them if possible. The fish men of the state of Washington and the Federal government went to work, studied the problem, made field surveys, and came up with a plan they hoped might work; but they weren’t sure.

     In essence the plan called for trapping the adult salmon on their return migration at Rock Island Dam below Grand Coulee, and moving them bodily in tank trucks to open tributaries that enter the Columbia below Grand Coulee. They were also trucked to a mammoth hatchery on the Wenatchee River for holding, ripening, and egg taking. In other words, fish that normally would have passed the site of Coulee Dam were transferred to waters below the dam in hopes that their offspring would “home” to the same waters instead of battling their heads against the base of Coulee Dam. This was the first large-scale effort ever made to change the habits of a regularly migratory animal. The program cost something over $5 million of Uncle Sam’s money. Today, some eight years after the program started, we do not know precisely the results obtained. It appears to be only partially successful; a few salmon are returning but the cost has been out of all proportion to the success.

     Bonneville Dam has a different story. It was built before Grand Coulee; but it was a low affair of only some seventy feet in height, so that fish ladders could be installed and be expected to get the fish upstream. Fish ladders would not operate successfully in Grand Coulee.

     Shasta Dam on the Sacramento River in California for the second time brought fishery biologists up against another major salvage program, involving heavy runs of salmon and steelhead. I was in charge of the Shasta salmon program from 1935 to 1945. Here the headaches were just as severe, the guesses just as wide, and the results as indeterminate as in the case of Grand Coulee. We were still learning. Everything that was learned from the work at Coulee was applied on the Shasta program and some of it helped very much. But there too, after spending over $1.5 million. The results to date are of doubtful value. As at Coulee, our efforts seem partially successful; there are a few salmon returning. But, with their main spawning grounds cut off, it is doubtful if they will survive in anything like their original numbers.

     But even bleaker prospects now face the salmon runs of the Sacramento. With Shasta completed, the Army Engineer Corps has proposed to build another major flood-control dam on the Sacramento River some forty miles below Shasta Dam. The Bureau of Reclamation, which built Shasta Dam, has an alternate plan which involves a series of dams on the tributaries. These, if built, would leave the main Sacramento untouched as far as Shasta Dam, and would not completely nullify the effort and funds already expended to save the runs blocked by Shasta Dam.

     The question is frequently asked, “Why can’t fish hatcheries save the runs?” Unfortunately the engineers have been led to believe (and they still believe it) that hatcheries are the simple and easy solution. If a dam blocks a run, put in a hatchery; that’s all there is to it. Unfortunately, the teachings of early-day fish culturists still form the basis of public thought on this problem. With salmon and steelhead, it is sadly in error. Even after seventy years of fish culture in this country, there is not onesingle major, commercial-sized run of salmon or steelhead being maintained by hatcheries alone. All hatcheries can be expected to do is to supplement natural propagation; that is all they will ever do over the broad reaches of western waters. This gets us back to what nature can and will do for us if given half a chance.

     If present plans of the dam builders go through, the rich anadromous fishery resources of the Columbia Basin are doomed. A total of some sixty-nine damsites are now under study in this basin alone. Among these is the McNary Dam, which has already been authorized by Congress for construction across the main Columbia above Bonneville near the mouth of the Umatilla River. If this is built, it will be the beginning of the end of steelhead and salmon runs in the upper Columbia River. Another main-river dam is proposed for construction below the McNary Dam at The Dalles near Celilo Falls. But the finishing touch will be the four-dam plan now being recommended by the Army Engineer Corps for construction on the Snake River to provide slack-water navigation to Lewiston, Idaho. All western fishery biologists with whom I have talked agree that this plan, if followed, will spell the doom of salmon and steelhead migrations up the Snake River as well as up its best tributary, the Salmon River in Idaho. As Ken Reid pointed out editorially in the January issue of Outdoor America, it is no consolation that government instead of private capital now exploits Americas rivers.

     Commercial and sport fishing for salmon and steelhead in the Columbia River brings in around $12 million a year to Oregon and Washington. If this were capitalized at 4 per cent, the investment would be worth some $300 million. Already the Columbia River has had some 75 per cent of its upper spawning grounds cut off by dams, and these encroachments plus the losses through irrigation and power developments have brought a serious decline in the numbers of fish available. The commercial salmon pack has, within recent years, been reduced to approximately half its thirty-year average. Doubtless overfishing is one contributing factor, but more important has been the indiscriminate construction of dams, pollution, and reduction of spawning grounds in the upper areas.

     Power is the main argument of the dam builders on the Columbia River. It is contemplated that power will provide the bulk of revenue to pay for construction costs and, of course, play a major role in the development of adjacent land areas.

     There is no doubt but that future population growth will warrant the generation of additional energy over present-day requirements. But before this is accomplished by the construction of additional new dams on the Columbia or its tributaries, why not completely develop the full potential power that can be had at dams already built and in operation? I am advised by competent authorities that over 2 million kilowatts additional could be obtained by: (1) installation of twelve additional 108,000-kilowatt generators at Grand Coulee Dam (it now has six and space was provided in the power house for eighteen), (2) installation of six more 20,000-kilowatt generators at the Rock Island Dam (on the Columbia River) of the Puget Sound Light and Power Co., (3) construction of Hungry Horse Reserve on the upper Columbia to increase Bonneville, Rock Island, and Grand Coulee power capacities by another 325,000 kilowatts, and (4) construction of the proposed Foster Creek Dam below Grand Coulee, where another 570,000 kilowatts could be obtained without any harm whatsoever to fishery resources. The Foster Creek Dam would not endanger fish runs to any major extent, since its site lies below Grand Coulee in an area where the runs have already been transferred to tributaries. Since competent persons studying the problems have recognized that additional power can be produced for some years without further hindrance to the runs, as outlined above, certainly it is not unreasonable to look toward a compromise that might delay at least for a period the eventual extinct of the fish runs in the Columbia Basin.

     Last fall I had the pleasure of boating down some forty miles of the Rogue River in southern Oregon. This stream, famous for its steelhead runs, produced for me the best angling I ever hope to have. For once in my life, I hit the jackpot. On one memorable morning, every single cast of a fly raised fish -four- and five-pound steelhead. But what of the future? In the Rogue River basin alone today fifty-five possible damsites are under study by Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Engineer Corps. The empire builders of both agencies eagerly cruising the area, seeking ways and means of ruining the best remaining steelhead stream in North America. There are five power dams proposed on the lower main river below Grants Pass, any one of which if built would destroy the runs of migratory fish, since it would be neither economically sound or biologically feasible to attempt to maintain them. Six power damsites are under study on the main river above Grants Pass, any one which would destroy the runs of fish passing the spawning grounds above Grants Pass. The Rogue River is the most important fishing stream for salmon and steelhead trout in the state of Oregon, if not on the entire Pacific Coast. Income from this resource has been carefully estimated to over $1,685,000 a year to the state. In order to give you an idea of the size of the runs in the Rogue – we have counted fish passing up the Gold Ray Dam fish ladder above Grants Pass since 1942. In that year some 72,000 chinook salmon, steelhead trout, and silver salmon were counted upstream. Any dam on the main stem of the Rogue would create a fish-salvage p problem of immense proportions. Facilities would have to be provided for holding and spawning 72,000 adult fish, and ponds for handling a total of some 82 million eggs these fish would produce. This would cost no less than $4 million, with annual operating costs of from $200,000 to $300,000. And even the expenditure of such huge amounts ~ would probably be futile because of the large numbers of fish concerned, lack of suitable streams for transfer of runs, and lack of suitable water supplies for hatcheries and holding ponds.

     One of the finest trout and salmon streams in the West is the Deschutes River which flows into the Columbia from Oregon near The Dalles. The engineers have selected a series of tentative damsites on this stream below Bend, Oregon to furnish supplemental irrigation water and power. Any one of these would ruin for all time one of the best fishing streams in the nation. Its recreational and economic values parallel those of the Owens River and Pit River in California, the Beaverkill and Ausable in New York, the Green and Gunnisen rivers in Colorado, and the Rogue in Oregon.

     Another famous angling stream, the McKenzie River in Oregon, tributary to the Willamette and Columbia should be mentioned. The engineers tentatively selected two major damsites, either one of which would break the “backbone” of the main stream and eliminate the boat fishing water for which this stream is justly famous. However, the sportsmen of Oregon have risen up in indignation and objected strenuously. A survey by the U. S. Engineer Corps indicated that angling and general recreation on this stream alone bring in over $500,000 annually to the state; so they backed up and have now proposed an alternative plan of tributary storage dams that leave the main stream untouched. Mert Folts, an ardent Itzaak Waltonite, led this fight and deserves much credit for his share in the struggle to save the McKenzie River.

     As Ken Reid has pointed out, there are good dams and there are bad ones, and what we need is a full and fair evaluation of all resources that will be affected by each. Public Law 732, passed by the 79th Congress, was a big step in the right direction. This law requires that full information on all values involved in dam building be obtained and presented to Congress in advance of authorization. Up to now, the dam builders have gone ahead without regard for wildlife values; Public Law 732 now requires that careful biological surveys be conducted along with the engineering studies. The Fish and Wildlife Service has gone rapidly ahead with its studies of various river developments on wildlife; from now on we expect that full consideration will be given to other values than merely power, irrigation, flood control, or navigation.

     Cost-benefit ratios of each dam usually form the basis of recommendations to Congress by the engineers. These are built up by the constructing agency, the agency that wants to build the dams. It has, of course, an axe to grind, a staff to keep busy. Some of the cost-benefit ratios presented for public consumption are outrageous travesties on human intelligence. As a case in point, the ratio of benefits to costs in the initial $60 million Willamette Valley project in Oregon, as given by the Army Engineer Corps, was 1.025 to 1. The estimated benefits very slightly exceed the estimated costs. When their estimates were made up a number of years ago, they figured on construction costs as they were at that time. The Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors; which must by law review such reports, offered the suggestion that it would be advisable to increase the estimated costs of the proposed reservoirs by some $5 million. This increase, in terms of interest and amortization, would correspondingly reduce the cost-benefit ratios to 0.95 to 1.0, which would make the project unfeasible economically.

     It is ironic that included in many of the engineers’ estimated benefits are those accruing from improved fishing and recreation that would purportedly result from their impoundments. Any informed biologist will tell you that flood-control reservoirs make poor homes for fish. The fluctuating forebay levels periodically dessicate out all fish foods dwelling in the richer shallow-water areas, with the result that many soon become biological deserts barren of foods and fish alike. Some reservoirs that are maintained at fairly stable levels have produced excellent angling, but these are few and far between.

     lt is equally ironic that many of the engineers’ tables of estimated costs do not include the loss from natural resources such as runs of salmon and steelhead. Usually their costs include moneys for fish facilities such as ladders, hatcheries, or other items based on the usual erroneous assumption that these will solve the fish problem. In the Willamette Valley project, for instance, the latest figure I have for total costs is some $60 million, of which one item labeled “fish facilities” carries the sum of $1 million, along with an estimated $95,000 for annual operating costs. If the completion of this project wipes out the Willamette salmon and steelhead runs as it may very well do, then among costs the sum of at least $1 million should be charged off as the value of the Willamette fishery to the state of Oregon.

     A perfect example of the impossible types of “recreational” benefits accredited to streams is found in plans proposed for improvements to the Tualatin River in Oregon. This is a small tributary of the Willamette. The Army Engineer Corps proposes spending the neat sum of over $10 million for flood and erosion control, bank improvements, drainage, and irrigation. The lower twenty-six miles of this stream is to be “improved” by putting in a concrete-sided ditch of even gradient, with all brush and cover removed for a distance of fifty feet on each side. All oxbows are to be eliminated and over sixteen miles of the natural stream bed removed. Recreational benefits are supposed to accrue to the tune of over $40,000 per year from boating, fishing, swimming, etc. The plan, in essence, would make a drainage ditch out of the Tualatin River and would completely ruin a crayfish fishery, runs of cutthroat trout and silver salmon, and fishing for resident rainbow in the “improved” sections-to the tune of over $60,000 a year in losses. Yet the engineers attempt to prove an annual benefit of over $40,000 over present conditions in the Tualatin. How would you like to have your favorite fishing hole obliterated by a concrete-sided ditch?

     I am just a poor befuddled taxpayer, and there are some things that I have trouble understanding. We are told by the Bureau of Reclamation that it hopes to create some 45,000 family-sized irrigated farms on about 4 million acres of lands within the next five years under the Missouri Basin plan. This is a fine idea, no doubt; but back in 1932 and 1933 I recall that farmers in California, where I lived, had so overproduced that green peas were selling for 1� cents a pound. Things are fine now for farmers and will continue so long as we feed three-quarters of the world. But the war-torn countries are mending, and in time the American farmer is going to have to seek other outlets. If we overproduced on the agricultural lands available in 1932, how is it going to be possible to sell the produce raised on an infinitely greater acreage that will far more than care for the population increases since then? The farmsteads of today are not “subsistence” units producing their own raw products. The history of American agriculture is one of overproduction. Even today the farmers are receiving millions of dollars in “parity payments” to take up the slack between costs and profits.

     What we need is an unbiased analysis, by experts, of all cost-benefit ratios prepared by the construction agencies in the various fields concerned, including engineering, fisheries, power, wildlife, irrigation, flood control, and agriculture. You and I can not judge the validity of the figures presented, and as taxpayers we haven’t the time; we’re too busy working to pay the taxes that build the dams. While this plan might mean setting up another government board or series of boards to review the engineer’s recommendations in light of all values and facts available, as a taxpayer I personally want expert, unbiased analyses of the mammoth river-basin projects being proposed. The acceptance without question of the engineering proposals of the agencies that will construct the dams is a little like accepting without question the advice of the first salesman we meet when we want to buy a new car. Maybe we ought to shop around a little.

     Another point to consider on the dam question is this: We have seen the “eager beavers” bent on changing the face of America, regardless of economic or aesthetic values concerned; frankly, the outlook for finding an unspoiled stream fifty feet wide after another fifty years will be pretty slim. In an earlier era we watched a Series of wild-eyed schemes that drained most of our lower marshes and spoiled hundreds of thousands of acres of waterfowl resting and feeding areas. Later, thousands of more dollars were spent to reflood some of those that were mistakenly drained to bring them back as refuges. Other areas have been set aside for various species of wildlife from time to time. If refuges can be created for birds and mammals, why not for fish? Possibly the term “refuge” is the wrong word to use here; but the idea of selecting and setting aside certain entire streams or portions of streams (including lakes), under law, to be maintained in a natural state without dams in any shape, or manner, for all time, might go a long toward saving at least a portion of the rich heritage left us in such self-renewing natural resources steelhead and salmon. Such streams as the Rogue and Umpqua rivers in Oregon, the Salmon in Idaho, Deer and Battle creeks on the upper Sacramento in California and many others could more than “pay their way” if set aside as fish refuges.

     In the February 22, 1947 issue of the Saturday Evening Post, an article by Edward Churchill, “Shall We Spend Two Billion More on the Colorado,” points out that Boulder Dam has not harnessed the Colorado, but instead has greatly increased the complexity of the water-supply problem in southwestern United States. Mr. Churchill points out that silt is entering Lake Mead above Boulder Dam at the rate of 14,000 carloads per day. He also points out that the deposition of silt in downstream areas below Boulder Dam has created, immense problems in its removal. It seems to the writer that the basic philosophy underlying the construction of high dams is entirely wrong and contrary to nature’s method of operating. The Colorado happens to carry a heavy load of silt; other streams such as the Willamette, Rogue, and Umpqua are much less afflicted this way, but all, during flood time, carry heavy amounts of debris. It is only a question of time before the dams will become filled with silt, flood-control storage will be lost, and the original purpose for which the dams were built defeated. Frequent annual floods are nature’s method of renewing soils in river valleys. The fine hop lands along the Willamette river and other western streams were made by floods, and hop growers there will tell you that they welcome the annual flooding of their lands for the fertilizing values they get from them.

     It is likely that future years will prove that proper land management with proper ground cover, plus (possibly) low dams but not high ones, will furnish us a better, more-economical, and more-permanent economy, better suited to our needs and in line with nature’s own methods.